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Misrepresentation and Third Persons
William L. Prosser*
Although modern tort law rejects the lack of privity as a defense
in most cases, there remains considerable uncertainty and confusion
when a third party institutes a suit based on misrepresentation. Dean
Prosser examines the various factors which affect the decison in a
third-party misrepresentation case and finds a pattern which he
reduces to a concise summary of the law in this area.

"The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace." So said Cardozo in 1931, and he has been much quoted since.
But the case' in which he said it was one of misrepresentation causing

pecuniary loss to a third person who acted in reliance upon it, but to
whom it was not made. It is in this area that the assault upon the

citadel has made, during the intervening thirty-five years, the least
headway, and has broken down into a tangle of more or less unconnected struggles which are apparently making no great progress

in any definite direction. It is here that there is still the greatest
uncertainty, and even confusion.2 It is the purpose of this discussion
to suggest that there are a great many more cases dealing with the

problem than is generally realized, that there is a pattern to be discerned from the decisions, and that some conclusions may be drawn.
I. FAcroRs

AFFECnING T=E DECISION

The defendant makes a misrepresentation of fact to A. B learns of
the misrepresentation and in reliance upon it suffers loss. Under what
circumstances is the defendant liable to B? Much of the difficulty in
C

Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

1. Ultramnares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441,
445 (1931).

2. See generally Goodhart, Liability for Innocent but Negligent Misrepresentations,

74 YALE L.J. 286 (1964); Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representators Responsibility, 17 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1938); Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to

Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Ruv. 583 (1958); Stevens, Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial
Creativity and Doctrinal Possibility, 27 MoD. L. REv. 121 (1964); Note, 31 CoLUM. L.
REv. 858 (1931); 16 CO-NEL. L.Q. 419 (1931); 36 IowA L. RFv. 319 (1951); 37
Micas. L. REv. 1091 (1939); 16 VAND. L. REv. 266 (1962); 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 77.
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dealing with this problem arises from the interplay of a number of
different factors affecting the decision-each of which, pulling in one
direction or the other, may affect it, so that the result is not unlike
that of a man being torn to pieces by an assortment of horses. It is
necessary to begin by listing these factors, and indicating their bearing.
A. The Nature of the Damage
In reliance upon the misrepresentation, B may suffer personal injury
or harm to his land or chattels. These are lumped together hereafter
under the general term "physical harm." Where this is the case, the
courts have been most willing to throw overboard privity, and allow
recovery to the third person. On the other hand, B may suffer only
pecuniary loss, as where he is induced to buy something at a price in
excess of its value. Throughout the law of torts, the courts have
been a great deal more reluctant to compensate the plaintiff for a loss
of a purely economic character, and this is particularly true where
the defendant's conduct has been no more than negligent. For
example, there is the tort of interference with contract, which is
3
commonly held not to lie where the conduct is merely negligent.
Another, actually involving misrepresentation, is the tort called, for
want of a better name, injurious falsehood, where the statement is
made to A and B suffers loss because it is A, rather than B, who believes and acts upon it. Here there appears to be agreement that the
action will not lie for mere negligence. 4 Where the misrepresentation
reaches B himself as a third person and he suffers loss because of his
own reliance and action upon it, the courts, as in these other actions,
have been alarmed at the spectre of pecuniary losses vastly disproportionate to the defendant's fault; and they have been much less
eager to impose liability.
There are other kinds of damage which may result from misrepresentation and result in liability; for example, the plaintiff is deceived
into cohabitation with the defendant by an invalid marriage,5 or in3. Numerous cases are collected in PRossER, ToRTs § 123, at 962-64 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PnossEa].
4. See, e.g., Dale System v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Sacco v. Herald Statesman, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 739, 223 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1961);
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 645, 50 N.Y.S.2d 287
(1944), aft'd, 268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1945), rev'd on other grounds,
269 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946). See also Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis
of Liability, 59 CoLum. L. RFv. 425 (1959).
5. Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413, 164 N.E. 609 (1929); Morgan v. McNab,
25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957); Friedman v. Libin, 4 Misc. 2d 248, 157 N.Y.S.2d
826 (1957), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 827, 161 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1957); Humphreys v.
Baird, 197 Va. 667, 90 S.E.2d 796 (1956).
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duced to leave a husband, 6 or induced to incur criminal penalties. 7 No
cases have been found in which such harm has resulted to a third
person; and in the nature of things they are not likely ever to arise.
In what follows, therefore, the discussion will be limited to "physical
harm" and "pencuniary loss."
B. The Basis of Liability

Tort liability traditionally is founded upon one of three bases:
intent, negligence, or strict liability without either. Liability for misrepresentation is no exception, and it must be divided into the three
familiar categories. The intent involved is intent to mislead, to
deceive; and it requires something in the way of knowledge or belief
that what is misrepresented is in fact false-or what the courts have
called scienter. The negligence involved is a failure to exercise reasonable care to make sure that the representation is true, even where
the defendant honestly believes it to be true. Strict liability, which is
a late comer to the field, holds the defendant responsible merely because he has made the false statement, even though he reasonably
believes it to be true and has exercised all reasonable care under the
circumstances.
Intentional misrepresentation has been identified with the action
of deceit since the leading English case of Derry v. Peek,8 which held
that that action could not be maintained against a defendant who had
made his statement in good faith, even though his honest belief in the
truth of what he said was an entirely unreasonable one. Lord
Herschell, in that case, was willing to extend the action to cover
representations made with reckless disregard as to whether what was
said was true or false; 9 and there are several American decisions which
have agreed.' Likewise, it appears that all of the American courts
have been willing to extend it to representations made by one who
is conscious that he has no sufficient basis of information to justify
them." A defendant who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge or
6. Work v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343, 128 Pac. 943 (1912).

7. Burrows v. Rhodes, [18991 1 Q.B. 816.
8. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
9. Id. at 360-61.
10. Cooper v. Schlesinger, 111 U.S. 148 (1884); Otis & Co. v. Crimes, 97 Colo.
219, 48 P.2d 788 (1935); Rosenberg v. Howle, 56 A.2d 709 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948);
Richards v. Foss, 126 Me. 413, 139 Ad. 231 (1927); Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 88
S.E.2d 94 (1955); Atkinson v. Charlotte Builders, 232 N.C. 67, 59 N.E.2d 1 (1950).
Or without any belief at all as to truth or falsity. Shackett v. Bickford, 74 N.H. 57, 65
At. 252 (1906); Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, 17 AUt. 673 (1889).
11. Sovereign Pocahontas Co. v. Bond, 120 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Byars v.

Sanders, 215 Ala. 561, 112 So. 127 (1927); Fausett & Co. v. Bullard, 217 Ark. 176,
229 S.W.2d 490 (1950); Davis v. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269, 143 N.W. 1073
(1913); Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8, 43 N.W. 566 (1889); State Street Trust Co. v.
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so positively as to imply that he has knowledge, 2 under circumstances

where he is aware that he will be so understood,'13 when he knows
that he does not know whether what he says is true, is found to have
the intent to deceive, not so much as to the fact itself, but rather as
to the extent of his information. In order to avoid repetition and
tedious detail, all of these types of conduct will be grouped together
hereafter under the single name of intent. There appears to be no

doubt that an intentional misrepresentation is actionable even when
it is made 14quite gratuitously, by one who has no interest whatever in
making it.

The misrepresentation may be an entirely honest one, but may be
negligently made, because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining

the truth, 15 or carelessness in the manner of expression, 16 or want of
the skill and competence required by a particular business or profession. 17 After Derry v. Peek the English courts drew the unfortunate
conclusion that, at least in the absence of some fiduciary relation
between the parties, 8 there was no remedy for merely negligent
misrepresentation, honestly believed, where the harm that resulted
Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
supra note 1; Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N.Y. 604, 47 N.E. 923 (1897); Zager v. Setzer,
supra note 10.
12. Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 121 Ind. 280, 22 N.E. 139 (1889); Bullitt v. Farrar, supra
note 11; Schlossman's, Inc. v. Niewinski, 12 N.J. Super. 500, 79 A.2d 870 (1951);
Pumphrey v. Quillen, 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956); First Nat'l Bank v.
Hackett, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703 (1914). A fortiori when the defendant represents that he has special knowledge. Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wash. 2d
318, 252 P.2d 772 (1953).
13. Thus where the matter is clearly susceptible of knowledge by the defendant.
Wiley v. Simmons, 259 Mass. 159, 156 N.E.2d 23 (1927). Otherwise where it is clear
to the plaintiff that it is not, or that the defendant is not asserting knowledge. Harris
v. Delco Products Co., 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.2d 740 (1940); Smith v. Badlam, 112
Vt. 143, 22 A.2d 161 (1941); cf. Duryea v. Zimmerman, 121 App. Div. 560, 106
N.Y.S.2d 237 (1907).
14. Lahay v. City Nat'l Bank, 15 Colo. 339, 25 Pac. 704 (1891); Flaherty v. Till,
119 Minn. 191, 137 N.W. 815 (1912); Robb v. Gylock Corp., 384 Pa. 209, 120 A.2d
174 (1956).
15. Maxwell Ice Co. v. Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., 80 N.H. 236, 116 Atl. 34
(1921); International Prod. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927);
Houston v. Thornton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898).
16. See Slater Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 183 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1910); Nash v. Minnesota Title & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N.E. 1039 (1895); Angus v. Clifford, 2
Ch. Div. 449, 472 (1891).
17. Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890). See Hawkins, ProfessionalNegligence
Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAN. L. REv. 797 (1959); Roady, Professional
Liability of Abstractors, 12 VAmrn. L. REv. 783 (1959); Rouse, Legal Liability of the
Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 3 (1934).
18. Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932 (solicitor and client); Woods v.
Martins Bank, [1959] 1 Q.B. 55 (banker and customer); Burke v. Cory, [1959] 19
D.L.R.2d 252 (Ont. App.) (investment counselor).
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to the plaintiff was only pecuniary loss. 9 They did, however, recognize a cause of action for negligence where there was physical harm.20
It was not until 1964 that the House of Lords, in Hedley Byrne &
Co. v. Heller & Partners,2 ' overthrew the existing law, and extended
the liability for negligence to pecuniary loss in any case where some
"special relation" between the parties could be found. The decision
is still too recent for the extensive dicta, strewn throughout the five
opinions in the case, to do more than leave a good many unsolved
problems for the English courts, as to the third persons to whom

this liability may extend.22
In the United States the English rule was at first accepted, although

a small minority of our courts refused to follow Derry v. Peek and

held that the deceit action would lie for negligent statements-either
declaring that the fault was sufficient and the reliance of the plaintiff
equally justified or resorting to the rather obvious fiction that a duty
to learn the facts, or not to speak without knowing them, was the
equivalent of actual knowledge.23 With the passage of time other
courts, recognizing the real basis of the liability, began to carry over
the negligence action from physical harm to pecuniary loss2 and to
allow the recovery. This view has ultimately prevailed and appears

now to be generally accepted American law.219. Cann v. Wilson, 39 Ch. Div. 39 (1888), began by finding liability for negligence;
but the case was overruled in Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, which was
followed in Old Gate Estates v. Toplis, [1939] 3 All E.R. 209, and Candler v. Crane,
Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164. See Goodhart, Liability for Negligent Misstatements, 78 L.Q. REv. 107 (1962); Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 67 L.Q.
REv. 466 (1951).

20. The Spollo, [1891] A.C. 499; Clayton v. Woodman & Son, [1962] 2 Q.B.
533; Watson v. Buckley, [1940] 1 All E.R. 174; Sharp v. Avery, [1938] 4 All
E.R. 85; White v. Broadbent, [1958] CaRm. L. REv. 129 (Eng.).
21. [1964] A.C. 465.
22. The actual decision was for the defendant, upon the ground of an effective
disclaimer of responsibility. The judges agreed that the liability would arise only
where there was some "special relation" between the parties, but they manifested
little agreement as to what that relation might be.
See Stevens, supra note 2. Goodhart, supra note 2; Gordon, Hedley Byrne v. Heller
in the House of Lords, 38 AusT. L.J. 39 (1964), 2 U. BmRT. COL. L. Rv. 113 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944); Scholfield Gear
& Pulley Co. v. Scholfield, 71 Conn. 1, 40 At. 1046 (1898); Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla.
241, 25 So. 678 (1899); Mullen v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 108 Me. 498, 81 At.
948 (1911); Vincent v. Corbitt, 94 Miss. 46, 47 So. 641 (1908).
24. Expressly spelled out in Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 Atl. 141 (1925).
25. Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962); De Zemplen
v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. Ann. 2d 197, 34 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963);
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn.
84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931); Suit v. Scandrett, 119 Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947);
McCray v. Refrigerator Co., 79 Nev. 296, 382 P.2d 600 (1963); International Prod.
Co. v. Erie R. Co., supra note 15; Houston v. Thornton, supra note 15; Dickle v.
Nashville Abstract Co., supra note 17; Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d
142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958); RFSTATEMENT, ToRTs § 552 (1939).
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Liability for negligent misrepresentation, like other negligence
liability, requires a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care;
and it is about the question of the duty that the third-person cases
have revolved. Even between the immediate parties, the lack of any
duty may prevent recovery, particularly where the statement made
is an entirely gratuitous one. A casual answer from a bystander to an27
26
inquiry as to the safety of premises or the weight of a tombstone
requires only an honest answer-not reasonable care. The same is
undoubtedly true of the curbstone advice or information given by an
attorney28 or a physician29 to one who is not a client or a patient. It
was on this basis that the Pennsylvania court" held that a trust company was not liable for negligence when it did a favor for the
plaintiff by permitting him to look at a will.
On the other hand, there are a good many cases holding that a
truck driver who takes the initiative by signaling an automobile driver
that it is safe to pass 31 or a pedestrian that he may walk in fronta
has by his affirmative conduct assumed the duty of care, and so is
liable if he is negligent. Particularly where the representation, although in itself gratuitous, is made in the course of the defendant's
business or professional relations, the duty is readily found to be
assumed;- and a physician who treats a contagious disease has been
held liable when he negligently assures those in the vicinity that there
26. Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948); Webb v. Cerasoli, 275
App. Div. 45, 87 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 603, 90 N.E.2d 64 (owner
assuring contractor in presence of workman).
27. Avery v. Palmer, 175 N.C. 378, 95 S.E. 553 (1918).
28. Fish v. Kelly, 17 C.B.(n.s.) 194, 144 Eng. Rep. 78 (1864).
29. Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 168 S.E. 770 (1936).
30. Renn v. Provident Trust Co., 328 Pa. 481, 196 Ad. 2 (1938). In accord is
Low v. Bouverie, [1891] 3 Ch. 82, where a trustee answered an inquiry from one
about to deal with the cestui. See also Vartan Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H.
390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943), where there was an answer to an inquiry about the credit
of a third person. Compare, as to information published in a newspaper, MacKown
59, 6 N.E. 526 (1937), and Curry v. Journal
v. Illinois Pub. & Printing Co., 289 Ill.
Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937).
31. Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Carter, 223 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1956); Haralson v.
Jones Truck Lines, 223 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892 (1954); Shirley Cloak & Dress Co.
v. Arnold, 92 Ga. App. 885, 90 S.E.2d 662 (1956); Thelen v. Spillman, 251 Minn.
89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957); Armstead v. Holbert, 146 W. Va. 582, 122 S.E.2d 43
(1961).
32. Sweet v. Ringwelski, 362 Mich. 138, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961); Miller v. Watkins,
355 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962) (waving driver on to pass bus); cf. Wolf v. Rebbun, 25
Wis. 2d 499, 131 N.W.2d 303 (1964) (exit from alley).
33. Washington & Berkeley Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 226 Fed. 169 (4th
Cir. 1915) (contractor to subcontractor); Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md.
287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938) (owner to invitee); Manock v. Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc.,
86 N.H. 411, 169 AUt. 881 (1934) (supplier of truck, as to insurance); Robb v.
Gylock Corp., supra note 14 (delivery of carboy); Valz v. Goodykoontz, 112 Va. 853,
72 S.E. 730 (1911) (owner to invitee).
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is no danger.m It is no doubt on this basis that the Hedley Byrne case 35
in England, where one bank gratuitously gave information about the
credit of its depositor to another bank, is to be justified.3
Strict liability for entirely innocent misrepresentation originated in
cases of rescission, where equity would grant the relief even where
there was only mutual mistake as to a fact basic to the transaction,
and no less readily where the mistake of the plaintiff had been induced
by the defendant's representation. 37 The first decision in which this
was carried over to a tort action for damages was one in which the
court appeared serenely ignorant that there was any difference in the
remedies; but it was followed by others39 in which the extension was
made quite deliberately, affording an additional remedy rather than
a new basis for the action to one who found it impossible or undesirable to rescind. There are now some eighteen of our courts40 which
allow the remedy 41 in cases of the sale or rental of property.4 The
liability has been rather narrowly limited to defendants who have
some pecuniary interest in making the representation, 43 to the exclu34. Skillings v. Allen, 143 Mich. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919); Edwards v. Lamb,
69 N.H. 599, 45 Ad. 580 (1899). In O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 App. Div.
2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960), this was carried to the length of finding an
assumed duty where a hospital nurse and its physician attempted to give free advice
over the telephone.
35. Supra note 21; cf. Giddings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S.W. 33 (1891), where
a bank president answering an inquiry was found to be acting in his capacity as a
bank officer.
36. The case was attacked on this ground of gratuitous information in Gordon, supra
note 22.
37. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. New Horizons, Inc., 28 N.J. 307, 146 A.2d 466
(1958); Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700
(1928); Fields v. Haupert, 213 Ore. 179, 323 P.2d 332 (1958); De Joseph v. Zambelli,
392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958).
38. Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396, 37 N.W. 497 (1931).
39. Such as Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S.E. 785 (1929).
40. Alabama, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Cases are listed in PRossF- § 102, at 726.
41. E.g., Stein v. Treger, 86 App. D.C. 400, 182 F.2d 696 (1949) (sale of whiskey);
Gulf Elec. Co. v. Fried, 218 Ala. 684, 119 So. 685 (1928) (lease of building);
Becker v. McKonnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 Pac. 496 (1920) (sale of water rights);
New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott A. Watrous Co., 306 Mass. 177, 27 N.E.2d
756 (1940) (sale of chattel); Ham v. Hart, 58 N.M. 550, 273 P.2d 748 (1954)
(sale of land); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312,
99 S.E.2d 606 (1957) (transfer of trust receipt); Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw Gas
Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 Pac. 984 (1926) (sale of patent rights).
42. The only cases found not involving the transfer of property are Baker v. Moody,
219 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1955) (inducing investment); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. J. D.
Pittman Tractor Co., 243 Ala. 354, 13 So.2d 669 (1943) (liability insurance policy);
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 27 S.E.2d 198 (inducing
loan). There appears to be no essential reason why the liability should not extend to
any commercial transaction.
43. As in Krause v. Cook, 144 Mich. 365, 108 N.W. 81 (1906) (agent receiving
commission); Tischer v. Bardin, 155 Minn. 361, 194 N.W. 3 (1923) (same); Kuehl
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sion of others44-such as an agent who receives no commission and has
no other personal interest in the matter.45
So far as third persons are concerned, the strict liability has been
identified with the "express warranty," without privity of contract,
given by the seller of chattels to the ultimate user or consumer. 47 This
originated in 1932 in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,48 where the court at
first found a "warranty" in disseminated literature stating that the glass
in an automobile windshield was "shatterproof," but on a second appeal49 justified the recovery on the basis of strict liability for misrepresentation. The courts have continued to talk warranty, where few of
the usual rules applicable to warranties between the immediate parties
can apply; but a recent decision in Tennessee 0 has returned, and surely
quite properly, to the theory of misrepresentation. All of the cases have
involved the sale of chattels by the defendant, and in most of them
the damage has been physical harm; but in several recent cases the
strict liability has been extended to pecuniary loss, as where the
ultimate purchaser of an automobile discovers that he has a bad
bargain because it is not as represented by the manufacturer. 5'
v. Parmenter, 195 Iowa 497, 192 N.W. 429 (1923); Huntress v. Blodgett, 206 Mass.
318, 92 N.E. 427 (1910); Giddings v. Baker, supra note 35; Osborne v. Holt, 92
W. Va. 410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922). Corporate officers, directors and promoters, whose
interest is sufficiently obvious, have been held liable for statements madte to induce
dealings with the corporation.
44. Dykema v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 348 Mich. 129, 82 N.W.2d 467 (1957);
Kolinski v. Reichstein, 303 Mich. 710, 7 N.W.2d 117 (1942); Rosenberg v. Cyrowski,
227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924); Steele v. Banninga, 225 Mich. 547, 1(06 N.W.
404 (1923); Neelund v. Hansen, 144 Minn. 228, 175 N.W. b38 (1919); Noble v.
Libby, 144 Wis. 632, 129 N.W. 791 (1911).
45. Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908); Williamson v.
Hannan, 200 Mich. 658, 166 N.W. 829 (1918); Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S.W. 1034
(Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
46. Thus in Russo v. Merck & Co., 138 F. Supp. 147 (D. R. I. 1956), it was held
that the supplier of blood plasma was not strictly liable in deceit to one with whom
there was no privity of contract.
47. See PRossER § 98, at 684.
48. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
49. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
50. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). The court relied
on a proposed REsTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND § 552D (Draft Nov. 7, p. 76) not
yet finally approved by the American Law Institute. Another decision to the same
effect is Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
51. Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Posey v. Ford Motor Co.,
128 So.2d 149 (Fla. App. 1961); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 593, 99 N.W.2d 670
(1959); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 583 (1965);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, supra note 50. Contra, Dimoff v. Ernie Major, Inc., 55
Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
Another way in which pecuniary loss may be recovered, without privity of contract,
is by way of indemnity for liability incurred to one to whom the chattel has been
resold. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
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C. Purpose, Expectation and Foresight That the Plaintiff May Act
The defendant may intend that his statement shall reach the plaintiff, and that he shall take action in reliance upon it; and he may make
the statement solely for that purpose, or for that purpose among
others. Without any such purpose or intent, and without any interest
of his own in inducing such action, he may have some special reason
to expect that it may be taken. He may, for example, be informed
that the plaintiff is interested in the matter and intends to rely on the
information; or he may know that the recipient of the representation
intends to pass it on to the plaintiff, or to a group in which he is
included, in the hope of inducing action. The representation may be
incorporated in a document intended to circulate, as in the case of a
bill of lading or a stock certificate; or it may be affixed to a chattel
expected to be resold. The tendency has been to treat such cases on
the same basis as those of purpose.
On the other hand, the defendant may have no special reason to
anticipate that the representation will reach others and induce their
action, but because of the ever-present fact that any human words,
written or oral, are capable of being repeated and passed on indefinitely, in a very general sense, it is always foreseeable that they
may come into the hands of any number of third persons. "Our echoes
roll from soul to soul, and grow forever and forever." 52 An extreme
illustration is the case of Howell v. Betts,- where the plaintiff, in
1958, bought land in reliance upon a survey and description negligently made by the defendant in 1934.
It is here that the courts have become genuinely disturbed at the
possibility of "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class," 5 4 and the prospect of a huge
and crushing burden of liability out of all proportion to the magnitude
of the defendant's fault.
D. The Size of the Group in Which Plaintiff Is Included
The plaintiff may be identified and known to the defendant as a
Tri-City Fur Foods, Inc. v. Ammerman 7 Wis. 2d 149, 96 N.W.2d 495 (1959); cf.
Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948); see note, 1965 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 144.
52. TENYsoN, THE PRINcEss.

53. 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
54. "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme
as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw does not exist in the implication of a duty that
exposes to these consequences." Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven
& Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441 444 (1931).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 19

person likely to take action at the time the representation is made. He
may be one of two, of five, of fifty, or of five hundred, whom it may
be intended or expected to reach and to influence. Or he may be
merely one member of an indeterminate class who may foreseeably
come into possession of the information and rely on it. It is here
again that the same spectre has haunted the courts.
E. The Characterof the Transaction
The transaction into which the plaintiff enters in reliance upon the
representation may be identical with that which it was intended
to induce; or it may be substantially similar. There seems to be
little doubt that substantial similarity is enough. If a balance sheet
is certified for a corporation in the expectation that it will be used
to obtain a bank loan in the amount of $10,000, the fact that the loan
is made for $15,000 will certainly not defeat any liability. It is a
different matter when the balance sheet is used to float a bond issue
of $500,000. Not only is there a great difference in amount, but the
bond issue is substantially a different thing from the loan. When
the transaction is clearly a different one-as where a letter praising
the plant of a title insurance company is written to aid it in obtaining
title business, but is used by the company to sell its corporate stock 55
-the same ghost has walked the corridors, and the line has been
drawn.
II.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE CASES

After this lengthy review of the various factors that bear upon the
liability to the third person, we may proceed to attempt some
classification of the cases.
A. Plaintiff Is Identified; Defendant's Purpose Is To Influence Him
Here there is invariably liability for intentional deceit. The defendant is held liable when the misrepresentation is made to A in
order that he may communicate it to B;6 where it is made to A in the
presence of B in order to induce B to act;57 where the defendant refers
55. New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, 63 App. D.C. 266, 71 F.2d 989
(1934).
56. Hoyt v. Clancey, 180 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950); Harold v. Pugh, 174 Cal. App.
2d 603, 345 P.2d 112 (1959); Hubbard v. Weare, 79 Iowa 678, 44 N.W. 915 (1890);
Campbell v. Gocb, 131 Kan.. 546, 292 Pac. 752 (1930); Watson v. Crandall, 7 Mo.
App. 233 (1899), aff'd, 78 Mo. 583 (1883); cf. Chubbuck v. Cleveland, 37 Minn. 466,
35 N.W. 152 (1929).
57. Alexander v. Beresford, 27 Miss. 747 (1854); Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176,
139 Pac. 1090 (1925).
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B to A as one who has the information; 58 and, of course, where A is

the agent of B and is known to be acting for him.59 Surprisingly
enough, there appear to be few cases of negligence6 0 or strict liability,6 '

although there can be little doubt that the plaintiff would recover.
B. PlaintiffIs Identified; DefendantHas Special Reason
To Expect His Action
Again the liability for intentional misrepresentation is sufficiently

clear. The defendant has been held liable when he knows that C
is interested in the information and is considering a deal, and he

makes the statement to B in the presence of CO or with the expectation
that C will obtain it from B.0 He has been held liable also when he

knows that B can be expected to approach C and seek to induce his
action.64 In the same category can perhaps be placed the cases in

which the representation is made to those who are known to intend

to form a corporations or a partnership 66 to take action, and the

intention is carried out. There are also two cases of the deceitful
seller of a chattel, who knows that it is intended for use by an iden58. Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (6th Cir. 1902); Hiller v. Ellis, 72
Miss. 701, 18 So. 95 (1895); Jamestown Iron & Metal Co. v. Knofsky, 291 Pa. 60,
239 AtI. 611 (1927).
59. Lewis v. McClure, 127 Cal. App. 439, 16 P.2d 166 (1932); Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 4 P.2d 657 (1931); Ettlinger v. Weil, 94
App. Div. 291, 87 N.Y.S. 1049 (1904) (letter to agent to be shown to principal).
60. Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d 718 (1937) involved
a sale of shoes for a child brought along by its mother. In Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465, the defendant knew that the information was
intended for one customer of the bank to which it was sent, but did not know his
identity. See also the cases of special reason to expect action on the part of an
identified plaintiff, infra notes 68-77.
61. There is Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P.2d 45 (1956), where
the representation was made to a school district to induce it to specify a product to
be used by plaintiff contractor. Compare Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239
P.2d 346 (1952), and Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595
(1946), both of which might perhaps be classified as involving purpose.
62. Southern States Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cromartie, 181 Ala. 295, 61 So. 907
(1913). In this case the court also found a duty to disclose the falsity when the
plaintiff subsequently bought from him.
63. Pilmore v. Hood, 5 Bing. N.C. 98, 132 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1838); Peabody Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Houseman, 89 Pa. St. 261 (1879); Houseman v. Girard Mutual Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 81 Pa. St. 256 (1876).
64. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Newton, 130 Conn. 37, 31 A.2d 462 (1943). Defendant made
the statement to one of two guarantors, knowing that he could be expected to communicate it to the other.
65. E. M. Fleiscbmann Lumber Corp. v. Resources Corp. International, 105 F.
Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1952); Iowa Economic Heater Co. v. American Economic Heater
Co., 32 Fed. 735 (N.D. Ill. 1887); Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Carman, 219 Cal.
184, 25 P.2d 839 (1933); Scholfield Gear & Pulley Co. v. Scholfield, supra note 23.
66. Cf. Henry v. Dennis, 95 Me. 24, 49 Atl. 58 (1901), where defendant answered
an inquiry sent to him on the letterhead of a firm.
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tiffed person other than the buyer.6 7
The negligence liability is no less clear. The defendant is liable
where, without proper care, he provides B with a title68 or weight
certificate,69 an abstract of title,70 an appraisal, 7 an audit 72 or a report

of a boiler inspection, 73 knowing that B intends to pass it on to C
and that C is contemplating action in reliance upon it. The report
may even be sent by the defendant to C at the request of B,4 or the75
defendant may be informed that B and C expect to act in concert.
Strict liability is represented by one case76 of an express "warranty"
sent by the defendant to a dealer who had requested it for a particular
customer, and perhaps by another 7 where a retailer made the statement to a mother knowing that she intended to use the chattel for
her infant child.
C. Plaintiff Is Identified: Defendant Has No Special Reason To

Expect His Action
There are a few cases involving intentional misrepresentation. In
one of them, in Texas, 78 the defendant, offering lots for sale, made
67. Woodward v. Miller & Karwich, 119 Ga. 618, 46 S.E. 847 (1904); Langridge
v. Levy, 2 M. &W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 519 (1836).
68. Economy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co., 64 N.J.L.
27, 44 Atl. 854 (1899).
69. Plata American Trading Co. v. Lancashire, 29 Misc. 2d 246, 214 N.Y.S.2d 43
(1957); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
70. Beckovsky v.Borton Abstract & Title Co., 208 Mich. 224, 175 N.W. 225 (1919);
Western Loan & Savings Co. v.Silver Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 Pac. 774
(1904); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890); Decatur
Land, Loan & Abstract Co. v. Rutland, 185 S.W. 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912); see Phoenix Title &
Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065 (1934).
71. United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960) (federal housing
appraisal).
72. American Indem. Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
73. Du Rite Laundry v. Washington Elec. Co., 263 App. Div. 396, 33 N.Y.S. 2d
925 (1942). The inspection was made for the buyer of the boiler, knowing that
the seller expected to rely on it in giving warranties, on which he was held liable.
Cf. Robitscher v. United Clay Products Co., 143 A.2d 99 (Mun. App. D.C. 1958),
where a layout for air conditioning was prepared for a builder, knowing that he
would rely on it in doing work on plaintiff's house.
Hopelessly out of line is Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d 921, 229 P.2d 492
(1951), where grade sheets were prepared for intended use by an identified contractor. To the contrary is M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District,
198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961), where the contractor was not even
identified.
74. Cann v. Willson, 39 Ch. Div. 39 (1888); Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317,
53 N.E. 779 (1899).
75. Bradley v. Bradley, 165 N.Y. 183, 58 N.E. 887 (1900).
76. Jeffery v. Hanson, supra note 61.
77. Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill.
App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946).
78. Westliff v.Wall, 153 Tex. 271, 267 S.W.2d 544 (1954).
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false statements about them to A in the presence of B, without any
reason to believe that B had any interest in the lots. He was held
not to be liable when B purchased a lot. There are a few others7 9 in
which the representation was made to A as an agent acting for B,
with no reason to suppose that A had any personal interest in the

matter, and it was held that there was no liability when A subsequently purchased the property in question from B. Cases of negli-

gence and strict liability appear to be lacking; but if the intentional
deceit is not actionable, there could scarcely be recovery on the other

grounds.
D. Plaintiff Is an Unidentified Member of a Group Or Class:
Defendant's Purpose Is To Influence Any of Its Members
There are a good many cases, all of them holding that the plaintiff
can recover. As to intentional deceit, the simplest case80 is that in which
the defendant sent false statements to "Mr. Hadcock." There were two
brothers named Hadcock, and the purpose was to influence either one
of them who would be willing to make a loan. But the group or class
need not be a small one, and may in fact be very large.8' Thus a
fraudulent seller of stock82 or a manipulator of the market 83 has been
held liable when he brought about publication of a newspaper story
and a reader bought stock in reliance upon it.
There is liability for deceit when false statements as to credit are
made to a commercial credit agency, for the purpose of reaching its
subscribers, 84 or even others a5 in order to obtain credit from them.
79. McCane v. Wokoun, 189 Iowa 1010, 179 N.W. 332 (1920); Walker v. Choate,
228 Ky. 101, 14 S.W.2d 406 (1929); Wells v. Cook 16 Ohio St. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436
(1865); Butterfield v. Barber, 20 R.I. 99, 37 Atl. 32 (1897).
80. Hadcock v. Osmer 153 N.Y. 604, 47 N.E. 923 (1897).
81. Compare the cases of direct representation to the public by advertising, such
as Rohrschneider v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 216, 32 Am. Rep.
290 (1879); De Kalb v. Hybrid Seed Co., 293 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
82. Holloway v. Forsyth, 226 Mass. 358, 115 N.E. 483 (1917).
83. Willcox v. Harriman Securities Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.) 1933).
84. Reliance Shoe Co. v. Manly, 25 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Weissman,
19 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1927); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928);
In re Epstein, 109 Fed. 874 (W.D. Ark. 1901); In re Weil, 111 Fed. 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1901); Fechheimer v. Baum, 37 Fed. 167 (S.D. Ga. 1889); Hulsey v. M. C. Kiser
Co., 21 Ala. App. 123, 105 So. 913 (1925); Forbes v. Auerbach, 56 So. 2d 895 (Fla.
1952); P. Cox Shoe Co. v. Adams, 105 Iowa 402, 75 N.W. 316 (1898); Courtney v.
William Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co., 97 Md. 499, 55 Ad. 614 (1903); Genesee Savings Bank
v. Barge Co., 52 Mich. 164, 17 N.W. 790, 18 N.W. 206 (1883); Mooney v. Davis,
75 Mich. 188, 42 N.W. 802 (1889); Pier Bros. v. Doheny, 93 App. Div. 1, 86
N.Y. Supp. 971 (1904); Arnold v. Richardson, 74 App. Div. 581, 77 N.Y. Supp. 763
(1902); Tindle v. Birkett, 171 N.Y. 520, 64 N.E. 210 (1902); Gainesville Nat'l
Bank v. Bamberger, 77 Tex. 48, 13 S.W. 959 (1890); National Bank v. Illinois
Lumber Co., 101 Wis. 247, 77 N.W. 185 (1898); cf. Stevens v. Ludlum, 46 Minn.
160, 48 N.W. 771 (1891); Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83 N.Y. 31, 38
Am. Rep. 389 (1880).
85. Davis v. Louisville Times Co., 181 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1910); Jamestown Iron &
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Also where a trustee falsely certifies an overissue of bonds,, or a bank
officer makes a false report,87 for the purpose of inducing the public

to buy. And when a prospectus is found to be issued for the purpose,
among others, of inducing the purchase of stocks or bonds on the
market, there is liability to such a purchaser.8 Likewise where A is
given a letter saying that his credit is good, to be exhibited to anyone

who may care to deal with him, the defendant is liable even though
he never heard of B, who deals with A.8 There has been recovery for
personal injury when the maker of a product misrepresents it, for
the purpose of reaching the ultimate user.90
The few negligence cases follow the same rule. The Hedley Byrne
case 9' in England found liability where the information was negligently furnished for a particular customer of the recipient bank, but
the defendant did not know his identify. In Granbergv. Turnham, 92
a California court found liability when the defendant negligently
gave information concerning its lands to a real estate board,
to be included in the board's multiple listing sent out to a large
number of prospective buyers. In New York a trustee negligently certifying bonds for a corporation, in order to aid in their
Metal Co. v. Knofsky, 291 Pa. 60, 139 At. 611 (1927). In Irish Am. Bank v. Ludlum,
49 Minn. 344, 51 N.W. 1046 (1892), where the question was one of estoppel the
court found no purpose to reach one who obtained the information from a subscriber.
86. Mullen v. Eastern Trust & Savings Bank, 108 Me. 498, 81 Atl. 948 (1911).
87. Taylor v. Thomas, 55 Misc. 411, 106 N.Y. Supp. 538 (1907). Accord,
Leonard v. Springer, 197 Ill. 532, 64 N.E. 210 (1902) (false statements in trust
deed to be recorded, liable to plaintiff who bought notes in reliance on the record);
Stickel v. Atwood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 At. 687 (1903) (corporate officer representing
bonds secured by all the property of corporation, liable to plaintiff lending money
and taking bonds as security).
88. Andrews v. Mockford, [1896] 1 Q.B. 372; Sims v. Tigrett, 229 Ala. 486, 158
So. 326 (1934). A fortiori where the plaintiff buys from the defendant. Accord,
Greene v. Mercantile Trust Co., 111 N.Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (prospectus
concerning bonds, intended also to reach purchasers of stock).
89. Young v. Hall, 4 Ga. 95 (1848); Diel v. Kellogg, 163 Mich. 162, 128 N.W. 420
(1910); Clopton v. Cozart, 11 Misc. 365 (1850); Williams v. Wood, 14 Wend. 126
(N.Y. 1835); Allen v. Addington, 7 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1831), aff'd, 11 Wend. 374
(N.Y. 1833); cf. Strutzel v. Williams, 109 Cal. App. 2d 512, 240 P.2d 788 (1952)
(statement intended to be repeated to others to secure additional investors). In Nash
v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437, 34 N.E. 625 (1893), a letter
concerning the title to land was given to its owner, to be used in the sale of mortgage bonds. It was held that there was liability to purchasers from the owner, but
not to subpurchasers, since there was no purpose of aiding the first purchaser to
resell.
90. Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1925); Wechsler v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1950) (false statements to druggists and physicians intended to reach users of the product). Accord,
as to false labels on products: Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d
859 (1931); Gold Kist Peanut Growers Ass'n v. Waldman, 377 P.2d 807 (Okla. 1962).
91. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, supra note 60.
92. 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958).
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sale, was held liable to a purchaser of the bonds. 93 There is one case 94
of a report negligently made to a mercantile credit agency and intended to reach its subscribers. And where the seller of chattels
negligently mislabels them, in order that the label may reach the
ultimate consumer, liability for physical harm has been imposed. 95
As for strict liability, the seller's advertising usually can be found
to be a representation made directly to the consumer; 96 but the liability
has been found in the case of labels on the goods, 97 or manuals,
brochures and other literature9 supplied to a dealer for delivery to
any purchaser, or an "insurance policy"99 given him for the same
purpose. It is apparently quite immaterial how the representation
reaches the plaintiff, so long as it is intended to do so and does.
93. Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
94. Durham v. Wichita Mill & Elevator Co., 202 S.W. 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
95. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953); La Plant v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 1961); Peterson v. Standard Oil
Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910); Wise v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 106, 361 P.2d
171 (1961), rehearingdenied, June 19, 1961.
96. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Arfons v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963); Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons,
130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174
A.2d 294 (1961); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963); Spiegel
v. Saks 34th St., 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., supra note 51; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., supra notes 48 & 49.
97. Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Co., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) ("boneless
chicken"); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331
(1956) (mattress, plaintiff stabbed by a spring in her "gluteal prominence"); Lane
v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278 P.2d 723 (1955) (canned
chicken); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (watermelon
seed); Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931) (seed);
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952)
(detergent); Darks v. Scudder-Gale Grocery Co. 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.W. 430
(1910) (ginger extract); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d
813 (1940) (insecticide).
98. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 296 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1960) (tire);
Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 96 (dynamite, literature);
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (automobile); Brown v. Globe Lab., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957) (sheep vaccine,
circular); see Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (wire rope,
manual). In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.
2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), garment tags and labels, advertising and sales
literature were all involved.
99. Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950) (automobile);
Beck v. Spindler, supra note 51 (house trailer); Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill. 1964) (representations concerning drug to physicians,
intended to reach users). Cf. Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 51 (contract form
for purchase of automobile); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438,
338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (written warranty of automobile).
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E. Plaintiff Is an UnidentifiedMember of a Group or Class:
Defendant Has Special Reason To Expect That Any
Member of It May Be Reached and Influenced
There is quite definitely liability here for intentional deceit. One
group of cases has involved embodiment of the representation in
some document, such as a stock certificate, 10 0 a promissory note,10 1 or

a bill of lading, 102 which is by its nature intended to circulate, or
even a label on a chattel expected to be resold. 103 Other courts
have found liability where the information is furnished with the

expectation that it will be published, 0 4 and of course all the more
readily when the publication is required by law. 10 5 Likewise there

has been recovery when the seller of goods intentionally misrepresents
their character or safety to a dealer, knowing that he intends to resell
106
them.
As these cases indicate, the group may be a very large one. Where

physical harm results from a misrepresentation as to chattels sold, it
has been held to include any ultimate user of the chattel. 10 7 But
100. Shotwell v. Mali, 38 Barb. 445 (N.Y. 1862); Bruff v. Mali, 36 N.Y. 200 (1867);
Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 Pac. 985 (1892); cf. Bank of
Atchison County v. Byers, 139 Mo. 627, 41 S.W. 825 (1897) (bond); Bank of
Montreal v. Thayer, 2 McCrary 1 (C.C. Iowa 1881) (receiver's cerificate).
101. National Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 58 N.E.2d 849 (1945);
People's Nat'l Bank v. Dixwell, 217 Mass. 436, 105 N.E. 435 (1914).
102. National Bank v. Kershaw Oil Mill, 202 Fed. 90 (4th Cir. 1912); cf. Baker
v. Hallam, 103 Iowa 43, 72 N.W. 419 (1897) (false abstract and blank deed to be
used).
103. Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931).
104. Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H.&N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859) (report to
stock exchange to qualify as member); Morse v. Swits, 19 How. Pr. 275 (N.Y. 1859)
(report by bank officer to bank, expecting it to be published).
105. Warfield v. Clark, 118 Iowa 69, 91 N.W. 833 (1902) (to state auditor); Ver
Wys v. Vander Mey, 206 Mich. 499, 173 N.W. 504 (1919) (filed articles of incorporation, public right to rely); City Bank v. Phillips, 22 Mo. 85, 64 Am. Dec. 254 (1855)
(to insurance authorities); Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 162, 122 N.W. 540 (1909)
(report of financial condition to Secretary of State); Parsons v. Johnson, 28 App. Div.
1, 50 N.Y. Supp. 780 (1898); Mason v. Moore, 73 Ohio St. 275, 76 N.E. 932 (1906)
(report by bank directors to Comptroller of the Currency); Coughlin v. State Bank,
117 Ore. 83, 243 Pac. 78 (1926) (report to Superintendent of Banks).
106. Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry, 236 Ala. 349, 182 So. 474 (1938); Quirici
v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 899 (1950); Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39,
43 Pac. 398 (1896); West Disinfecting Co. v. Plummer, 44 App. D.C. 345 (1916);
State to Use of Hartlove v. Fox, 79 Md. 514, 29 Atl. 601 (1894); Skinn v. Reuter, 135
Mich. 57, 99 N.W. 152 (1903); Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W.
1103 (1892); Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098 (1905);
Maytag v. Arbogast, 42 Ga. App. 666, 157 S.E. 350 (1931). Usually these cases have
called the cause of action one of negligence toward the plaintiff.
107. Johnson v. Ernest G. Beaudry Motor Co., 170 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ga. 1958)
(wife driving car); Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ca. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962)
(employee using chattel); Pullman Co. v. Ward, 143 Ky. 727, 137 S.W. 1047 (1911)
(same); Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 213 N.C. 775, 197 S.E. 757 (1938) (wife
riding in car).

MISREPRESENTATION

even in the cases of pecuniary loss the liability for intentional mis-

representation may be quite extensive. In UltramaresCorp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co.,1' 8 which is still the great leading case in this field,

accountants who certified a balance sheet for a corporation were held
liable to a company which made a loan to it on the basis of conscious
ignorance whether the balance sheet was correct. The defendants
knew
that in the usual course of business the balance sheet when certified would
be exhibited by the [recipient] to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers
or sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial
dealings.... The range of the transactions in whiceh a certificate of audit
might be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possi09
bilities of the business that was mirrored in the summary.1

There was, in other words, mere expectation of some entirely un-

specified business use of the certificate-it was not obtained to be
thrown in the waste-basket. This approaches, although it does not

quite reach, the general possibility of reliance by others from which

the courts have recoiled." 0 The decision was reaffirmed in State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst,"' where the accountants knew merely that the
certificate was to be used "to obtain credit"; and there are a few other
cases of such certificates apparently in accord. 1 2 There is also a
California decision 1 3 where a certificate of termite clearance given to

a buyer of land was held to inure to the benefit of a subpurchaser
on the ground that it was intended for use by "such persons as were
transacting business" with the buyer in connection with the property.
When the misrepresentation is only negligent, the liability for
physical harm has been quite as extensive as in the case of deceit.

The seller of goods expected to be resold has been held liable not
only to the ultimate buyer," 4 but also to anyone making the expected

If the liability for negligence is to extend to those in the vicinity of the expected
use, infra note 116, it is probable that the liability for intentional misrepresentation
would also be so extended. No cases have been found.
108. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
109. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442. "To creditors and investors to whom the employer
exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud,
since there was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not
intend to keep it to hmiself." Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. A significant fact is that the
defendant supplied the corporation with thirty-two copies certified with serial numbers
as counterpart originals. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
110. Infranotes 141-55.
111. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
112. Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1954), aff'd mem., 285 App.
Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1954) (it is not altogether clear that the plaintiff was
not identified); Mutual Ventures, Inc. v. Barondess, 17 Misc. 2d 483, 186 N.Y.S.2d
308 (1939); see Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 268 P.2d 231 (1954).
113. Wice v. Schilling, 124 Cal. App. 2d 735, 268 P.2d 231 (1954).
114. Riggs v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Fed. 199 (D. Minn. 1904); Kentucky Inde-
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use of the thing sold,115 and even to one in the vicinity injured by
such use." 6 The defendant who inspects a boiler or an elevator and

reports it to be safe" 7 becomes liable to those to whom injury may
be foreseen if he is negligent in doing so.

It is when pecuniary loss is in question that difficulties begin to
arise. Certainly there is a much narrower limitation of liability in
pecuniary loss cases than in the cases of intentional deceit and those

of physical harm. In the Ultramares case1 8 Cardozo refused to extend
the liability of accountants who were merely negligent to one who
made a loan, but could claim nothing more in the way of special
reason to anticipate his action than the general use of certified
balance sheets for some kinds of business purposes. He raised a host
of terrifying spectres :19
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many
callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to
the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion
will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent
as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. Title companies
insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will become
pendent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925); Driekosen v. Black,
Suvalls & Bryson, 158 Neb. 531, 64 N.W.2d 88 (1954);Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co.,
73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913); Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106
Pac. 337 (1910). There are also a good many cases such as Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Deselms, 212 U.S. 159 (1909), in which failure to disclose a known danger has
been equated with negligent misrepresentation.
115. Johnson v. Ernest G. Beaudry Motor Co., supra note 107 (wife driving car);
Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355 (1912) (employee); Fort
Wayne Drug Co. v. Flemion, 93 Ind. App. 129, 175 N.E. 170 (1931) (same); La
Plant v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 95 (user); Cunningham v. C. R.
Pease House Furnishing Co., 74 N.H. 435, 69, At]. 120 (1908) (spouse using stove
polish); Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 181 App. Div. 97, 168 N.Y. Supp. 505
(1917) (child of buyer); Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 97, 168 N.Y.
Supp. 505 (1917) (same).
116. Nichols v. Clark, McMullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N.Y. 118, 184 N.E. 729 (1933)
(product misrepresented to engineers as proper covering for air duct, and used on
plaintiff's house); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
117. Van Winkle v. American Steam Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl. 472
(1899). Usually this is put on the ground of negligent performance of the assumed
duty to inspect, without mention of the report to the owner which in all probability
was made. Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940);
Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960); Dickerson
v. Shepard Warner Elevator Co., 287 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1961); Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp., 31 IlI. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co.,
262 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1953); Durham v. Warner Elevator Co., 166 Ohio St. 31, 139
N.E.2d 10 (1956); Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961); Bollin
v. Elevator Const. & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949); see Mays v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963). See Note, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1615 (1965).
118. Supra note 108.
119. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
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liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without payment

of a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little,
if any, farther than we are invited to go now. Negligence, moreover, will

have one standard when viewed in relation to the employer, and another
and at times a stricter standard when viewed in relation to the public. Ex-

planations that might seem plausible, omissions that might be reasonable,
if the duty is confined to the employer, conducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon his creditors, might wear another
aspect if an independent duty to be suspicious even of one's principal is
owing to investors. 'Every one making a promise having the quality of a
contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but
under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of po-

tential beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one
relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations,
inescapably hooked together.' 120 'The law does not spread its protection
' 121

so far.

In two other decisions-'2 other courts have reached the same conclusion as to the accountant negligently certifying a balance sheet.
But what if the defendant is informed that his representation is to
be passed on to some more limited group, as a basis for action on
the part of one or more of them? In M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra

Costa Sanitary District,- a California decision, an engineering company was hired to prepare a soil report, knowing that it was intended
to be made available to all bidders for work on a sewer system and to
be used by the successful bidder to do the work. It prepared the
report negligently and the bidder lost money; accordingly it was
held liable for negligent misrepresentation. The same conclusion, upon
quite similar facts, was reached by the district court in Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga;- but on appeal' 25 the Sixth Circuit
reversed the decision and held that there was no liability.
There are, however, three elements that tend to weaken the authority of the Texas Tunneling Co. case. One is that the court considered itself bound, as a matter of Tennessee law, by a Tennessee
case2 6 in which there was no special reason to expect the plaintiff's
action. Another is that the court adopted a very narrow interpretation
of the Ultramares case, saying that it held (as it assuredly did not)
that the accounting firm was not liable for simple negligence "to a
120. Quoted from H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168, 159
N.E. 896, 899 (1928).
121. Quoted from Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309

(1927).
122. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa.

St. 406, 107 AUt. 783 (1919).
123.
124.
125.
126.

198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).
204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964).
Howell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 324, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
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plaintiff who was neither specifically foreseeable by it nor in privity
with it."m The third is that the court laid considerable stress upon
a disclaimer of accuracy and responsibility contained in the report
itself. Other cases will no doubt have to resolve the conflict; but the
writer would hazard the guess that of the two cases it is the Miller
decision which is the more likely to be followed.
Strict liability is represented by one California case'as in which
representations made to a contractor concerning the suitability of
plastic pipe for a particular heating system were held to constitute an
express "warranty" to the plaintiff when the contractor used it in
constructing his building. The case was one of pecuniary loss.
F. The Effect of a Public Duty
Statutes requiring information to be filed for public record, 129 and
particularly those which require it to be published after filing, may
considerably expand the class of persons whom the defendant has
special reason to expect his representation to reach. Such statutes
commonly are held to create a duty130 to such members of the public
as may enter into transactions of the kind in which the legislation
is intended to protect them. There is, consequently, liability for intentional misrepresentations' 3' and also for those which are merely
negligent. 1 Strict liability is imposed under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933,13 as amended, a discussion of which is beyond
the scope of this paper. 34
It is apparently on the same basis that public officers who give
out information in the performance of their public duties have been
held liable for mere negligence to those members of the public who
are intended to be protected by the creation of the office and the
127. 329 F.2d at 407. (Emphasis added.)
128. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1963).
129. Ver Wys v. Vander Mey, 206 Mich. 499, 173 N.W. 504 (1919) (public right to
rely).
130. Otherwise where the filing requirement was construed as not intended for the
protection of the public. Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286, 28 N.E. 267 (1891)
(statement as to paid-up capital stock); Webb v. Rockefeller, 195 Mo. 57, 93 S.W.
772 (1906) (articles of incorporation). It may be doubted that such an interpretation
would be given to the requirement today.
131. See note 105 supra.
132. Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 677, 186 N.Y.S.2d
103 (1959) (certified map filed as public record; surveyors and engineers held liable);
Mason v. Moore, supra note 105 (bank report to Comptroller of the Currency).
133. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
134. See 3 Loss, SEcur1TiS REGULATION 1719-42 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas, The
Federal Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933). See also, as to possible liability under section
lOB of the amended act, Note, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
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duty.135 Thus an official food inspector who certifies that fish is fit for
human consumption becomes liable to the ultimate purchasers of the
food. 136 The same rule has been applied to recording clerks'3 7 who sup-

ply certified copies of their records, and to notaries taking acknowledgments and certifying the identity of the person who signs.t1

These

cases are probably not to be classified as opening the door to mere
general foreseeable possibility of reliance and action, but rather as
statutory expansion of the class whose action there is special reason

to expect.
G. Plaintiff Is Unidentified: Defendant Has No Special Reason
To Expect that he May Act in Reliance

It is here that the line is definitely drawn. The defendant may well
be aware that his representation is capable of being passed on to
others, and that at some subsequent date it may come into the hands
of someone who will rely on it, act upon it, and suffer loss if it is
false. 139 But this amounts to nothing more than the general foresee135. There are occasional cases where no public duty has been found. New England
Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Brock, 270 Mass. 107, 169 N.E. 803 (1930), where a notary's
acknowldegment of the discharge of a first mortgage was held to involve a duty only
to the register of deed, and not to a second mortgagee who relied on the record,
appears quite indefensible. The same is true of the grain inspection in Gordon v.
Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (1882). But Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L. 5 (1874),
where a tax collector gave a receipt, and Day v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y. (23 Hun) 131 (Sup.
Ct. 1880), where a county clerk made a title search, and Houseman v. Girard Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 81 Pa. 256 (1876), where a register of deeds did the same, are
probably to be justified on the ground that this was no part of the officer's public
duties.
136. Pearson v. Purkett, 32 Mass. (15 Pick) 264 (1834); Hickerson v. Thompson, 33
Me. 433 (1851); Tardos v. Bryant, I La. Ann. 199 (1846).
137. Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1907) (city clerk); cf. Cole v.
Vincent, 229 App. Div. 520, 242 N.Y. Supp. 644 (1930) (county clerk erroneously
docketing judgment); Commonwealth to Use of Green v. Johnson, 123 Ky. 437, 96
S.W. 801 (1906) (county clerk taking acknowledgement).
138. Anderson v. Aronsohn, 181 Cal. 294, 184 Pac. 12 (1919); Bellport v. Harkins,
104 Kan. 543, 180 Pac. 220 (1919); Curtiss v. Colby, 39 Mich. 456 (1878); Barnard
v. Schuler, 100 Minn. 289, 110 N.W. 966 (1907); Gardner v. Webber, 177 Mo. App. 60,
164 S.W. 184 (1914); Harrington v. Vogle, 103 Neb. 677, 173 N.W. 699 (1919).;
Peterson v. Mahon, 27 N.D. 92, 145 N.W. 596 (1914); Erie County United Bank v.
Berk, 73 Ohio App. 314, 56 N.E.2d 285 (1943); Clapp v. Miller, 56 Okla. 29, 156 Pac.
210 (1916); Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917); Lowe v. Wright, 40
Tenn. App. 525, 292 S.W.2d 413 (1956). Mention should be made of statutes in a
few states which have imposed a duty of care upon abstractors of title, for the benefit
of those who take action in reliance upon the abstract. E. T. Arnold & Co. v. Barner,
91 Kan. 768, 139 Pac. 404 (1914); Gate City Abstract Co. v. Post, 55 Neb. 742, 76
N.W. 471 (1898); Sackett v. Rose, 55 Okla. 398, 154 Pac. 1177 (1916); Goldberg v.
Sisseton Land & Title Co., 24 S.D. 49, 123 N.W. 266 (1909). These, of course, are
more specific, but have the same effect.
139. "Any sophisticated surveyor will know that his survey, though prepared for a
particular transaction, will become a part of the file containing the title papers to
the land surveyed and will most likely be passed on from, one owner to the next.
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ability of transmission to others which is inseparable from the human
word. In the face of the entirely indeterminate extent, magnitude
and duration of the liability, the courts always have drawn back from
its imposition.
Even for intentional deceit there is no liability to one who reads a
letter concerning the credit of A, addressed only to B and not intended or expected to be transmitted. 140 Neither is there liability to
subpurchasers of land,' 4 ' stock,1 or bonds,143 or the assignees of
mortgages"'4 or leases, 145 whom the false representation was not
intended or expected to reach. A prospectus sent out to induce the
purchase of treasury stock from the defendant creates no liability to
purchasers who buy from others on the open market. 46 The trustees
of a bank who make statements as to its soundness are not liable to
those who147 learn of them and go surety on the bond of the bank's
treasurer.

As might be expected, the cases are no less clear when the representation is only negligent. The outstanding object lesson is the
case of Jaillet v. Cashman,148 where a stock ticker service negligently

sent out the report that the Supreme Court had held stock dividends
Such successive owners often do rely upon such surveys even though they have no
contractual rights in them." Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, supra note
124, at 407.
140. McCracken v. West, 17 Ohio 16 (1848). Compare Williamson v. Patterson,
106 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), where the statement was made to A before
he became the agent of B.
141. Lembeck v. Gerken, 88 N.J.L. 329, 96 Ad. 577 (1916); Cohen v. Citizens
Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 300 P.2d 14 (1956); Bechtel v.
Bohannon, 198 N.C. 730, 153 S.E. 316 (1930); Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373
P.2d 382 (1962). Even where the subpurehaser is the identified agent to whom the
statement was made. See note 79 supra.
142. Abel v. Paterno, 245 App. Div. 285, 281 N.Y. Supp. 58 (1935).
143. Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., supranote 89.
144. ibid. Accord, as to contracts to purchase land, Nearpark Realty Corp. v. City
Investing Co., 112 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Puffer v. Welch, 144 Wis. 506, 129
N.W. 525 (1911). Contra, under statute, Jackson v. Meinhardt, 99 Cal. App. 283, 278
Pac. 462 (1929) (contract).
145. Pamela Amusement Co. v. Scott Jewelry Co., 190 F. Supp. 465 (D. Mass. 1960),
Abel v. Paterno, supra note 142; cf. Simar v Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298 (1873) (donee of
securities).
146. Compare, where there was an entirely different type of transaction, New York
Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, 63 App. D.C. 266, 71 F.2d 989 (1934); Cheney v.
Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109 (7th Cir. 1909); Greenville Nat'l Bank v. National Hardwood
Co., 241 Mich. 524, 217 N.W. 486 (1928); Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 Eng. & Ir. 377
(1873); King v. Livingston Mfg. Co., 180 Ala. 118, 60 So. 143 (1912); cf. Gillespie
v. Hunt, 276 Pa. 119, 119 Ad. 815 (1923); Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 Ill. 511, 179
N.E. 42 (1931).
147. Ashuelot Savings Bank v. Albee, 63 N.H. 152 (1884); cf. Cliftex Clothing Co.
v. Di Santo, 88 R.I. 338, 148 A.2d 273, 754 (1959) (statement to buyer of stock of
merchandise and fixtures that there were no creditors does not redound to benefit of
creditors).
148. 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
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to be taxable income, and the plaintiff sold short on the market in
reliance upon the report. Even the most enthusiastic partisans of
the plaintiffs are likely to be somewhat startled at the prospect that
everyone in the nation who did so could recover losses beyond estimation for an inadvertent error. Other cases have agreed. An abstractor
15 1
of title, 4 9 a surveyor, 15 0 one reporting on the progress of a building,
an inspector of goods,'152 a telegraph company negligently transmitting

a message, 153 one who signed a release of lien claims in the wrong
place, 154 and even the seller of a chattel who the court found reasonably did not expect it to be used by a third person' 5 have been
held to be under no duty to a plaintiff who is merely a member of
the world at large.
The same rule has been carried over, in a few cases, to strict
liability, where the express "warranty" has been given to a dealer, or
to a purchaser of the chattel, without any special reason to expect
that it would be passed on to a third person. 15 6
149. Abstract & Title Guar. Co. v. Kigin, 21 Ala. App. 397, 108 So. 626 (1926);
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065 (1934);
Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins.
& Guar. Co. 165 Cal. App.2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958); Sickler v. Indian River Abstract
& Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940); Ohnart v. Citizens' Say. & Trust Co.,
82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N.E. 577 (1924); Syrnns v. Cutter 9 Kan. App. 210, 59 Pac.
671 (1900); Cole v. Vincent, supra note 138; Thomas Guarantee Title & Trust Co.,
81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of
Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907); Peterson v. Gales, 191
Wis. 137 210 N.W. 407 (1926). Accord, as to attorneys reporting on a title search,
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Dundee Mortgage & Trust Inv. Co. v.
Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (C.C. Ore. 1884).
150. Howell v. Betts, supra note 126.
151. Le Li~vre v. Gould, [1891J 1 Q.B. 491.
152. National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924). See
also Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. N.Y.
1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
153. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Schriver, 141 Fed. 538 (8th Cir. 1905).
154. Treadway v. Ingram, 102 Pa. Super. 450, 157 Adt. 4 (1931); cf. New York
Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, supra note 146 (letter written to reach customers of
title insurance business relied on by purchaser of stock in the company).
155. Heggblom v. Wanamaker, 178 Misc. 792, 36 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1942), aff'd mere.,
266 App. Div. 916, 43 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1943). The case appears to be out of line with
those holding the seller liable to the user of the chattel. Supra note 115.
156. Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); Hermanson
v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (1954); Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550,
76 A.2d 801 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950); Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529,
58 N.E.2d 825 (1945); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E.
423 (1928); Silverman v. Samuel Malinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953);
Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
A plaintiff whose injury is not caused by reliance upon the representation cannot
recover on the basis of the express warranty. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1955); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1941); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769; Dobbin v.
Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946).
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H. The Different Transaction
Where the transaction into which the plaintiff enters is of a substantially different kind from that which the defendant intended or
expected to induce, the line is always sharply drawn. This has
received frequent mention in the cases of subpurchasers, 157 particularly
where stock is purchased on the open market instead of directly from
the defendant. 1 But the same conclusion has been reached where
the plaintiff buys the property securing bonds instead of the bonds, 15 9
or stock in a title insurance company instead of title insurance. 160
Somewhat analogous are one or two cases holding that the express
"cwarranty" of the seller of a product does not extend to abnormal
uses not intended or expected. 161
III. SUM~MR
One who makes a false representation is liable, whether on the
basis of intent, negligence or strict liability, to
1. Those whom he intends, for his own purposes, to reach and
12
influence by the representation. This may be a very large group.
2. Those to whom a public duty is found to have been created by
163
statute, or pursuant to statute.
3. Those members of a group or class whom he has special reason
to expect to be influenced by the representation.'"
It is here that
there is some uncertainty. In the cases of intentional misrepresentation, it has been held that knowledge that the recipient of the information intends to make some unspecified business use of it is sufficient
special reason. Where there is only negligence, this is clearly not
enough, and something more in the way of special likelihood that the
representation will reach a limited group or class is at least required.
The two cases 165 which have faced the problem have disagreed as to
whether even this is enough.
One who makes a false representation is not liable, whether on the
basis of intent, negligence or strict liability, to
157. Supra notes 142-45.
158. Supranote 146.
159. Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 Ill. 511, 179 N.E. 42 (1931).
160. New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, supra note 146; cf. Ashuelot Say.
Bank v. Albee, 63 N.H. 152 (1884), where oral statements as to the soundness of a
bank induced the plaintiffs to become surety on the bond of its treasurer.
161. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (wire rope put to
wrong use); cf. Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal,
Rptr. 322 (1963) (no implied warranty where drug sold without prescription).
162. See text accompanying notes 56-61, 80-99 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 130-38 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 62-77, 100-28 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra.
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1. Those whom he has no purpose to reach and influence, and as to
whom he has no special reason to expect that it will do so. 1' 6
2. Those who enter into transactions of a substantially different
167
kind from that which was intended or to be expected.
166. See text accompanying notes 78-79, 139-56 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 157-61 supra.

